

POLICY BRIEF

Advancing ‘Prosocial Tech Design’ and shaping the EU’s platform design governance

1. Introduction

What role can EU regulation play in shaping the design of platforms? And how can “prosocial tech governance” policy framework contribute to the implementation of emerging EU digital regulations? What is the current state of tech policy and regulation in the Global Majority? What are potential pathways for integrating design governance? These were the leading research questions inspiring the workshop “[Prosocial Tech Design Governance: Exploring Policy Innovations](#)”. Co-organised by the Global PeaceTech Hub at the Florence School of Transnational Governance (STG), and the [Council on Technology and Social Cohesion](#), the workshop had two main goals: (i) Analyse the evolution of “prosocial tech governance” in Europe, North America, and the Global Majority, focusing on policy interactions with regulations such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and recent US legislation; (ii) Contribute to the draft ‘Blueprint for Prosocial Tech Design Governance,’ a policy framework for promoting technology that fosters safer and more cohesive societies.

During the workshop, the co-chairs of the Council, Lisa Schirch, Lena Slachmuis, and Ravi Iyer, presented the outline of their draft ‘Blueprint on Prosocial Tech Design Governance’ and discussed related policy frameworks to inform EU design regulation¹.

1 For an updated version of the Blueprint, please consult the Council of Technology and Social Cohesion website at <https://techandsocialcohesion.org/>. See also Devika Malik, “Mapping Tech Design Regulation in the Global South” Toda Peace Institute, February 2025, forthcoming.

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Moreover, they have organized and led three working groups to discuss and analyze (i) the EU Adoption of Design Governance, (ii) How to incentivize the adoption of prosocial tech design ideas in the Global Majority, and (iii) the Blueprint's specific components as well as explore out-of-the-box approaches to design governance.

This policy brief is organized as follows. First, an overview of the Council on Tech and Social Cohesion's draft Blueprint on Prosocial Tech Design Governance is offered. Second, the main takeaways from the workshop event are summarized. Subsequently, a series of key policy recommendations are presented. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn.

2. The Blueprint on Prosocial Tech Design Governance

Prosocial tech design refers to “the set of design patterns, features, and processes that foster healthy interactions between individuals and which create the conditions for those interactions to thrive by ensuring individuals’ safety, well-being, and dignity ([Prosocial Design Network](#)). It can also be conceived as a comprehensive policy approach based on three main assumptions: first, tech governance is too often focused on content moderation and harms, not the design itself, that may produce (and prevent) those harms². Second, what we experience online today is not unavoidable, and designing social media that does less harm and more good for humanity is possible. Third, market forces alone cannot create the incentives for a “prosocial digital public square”, so it is up to governments, regulators, civil society, as well as platforms and users, to create such incentives (Schirch et al. 2023).

Based on these premises, the Blueprint for Prosocial Tech Design Governance emerges as a collective research effort led by Lisa Schirch, based at the University of Notre Dame, along with global members of the Council on Technology and Social Cohesion. The workshop at EUI was one of eight that took place over the last year, seeking civil society input.

The aim was to analyze the landscape of issues underlying deceptive and antisocial tech designs and propose design solutions that reduce harm and promote social good. Inspired also by EU design-focused regulations that address the societal impacts of technology, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - which mandates “Privacy by Design” requiring data protection measures to be integrated from the outset of system development - and the Digital Services Act (DSA) - which requires online platforms to assess and mitigate risks like illegal content and promotes transparency in algorithms and user interfaces - the Blueprint advocates for similar design-focused regulations, highlighting the need to shift from reacting to harm to proactively designing technology for social good. In practice, the Blueprint proposes a tiered framework for prosocial tech design:

- Tier 1: Minimum Standards. This is focused on reducing harm and ensuring user safety. It draws on the University of Southern California's [Neely Design Code](#), which outlines nine evidence-based minimum standards for social media platforms. These standards include allowing users to explicitly indicate content preferences, prioritising amplification of trusted actors, and enabling privacy by default for minors. Examples include the promotion of transparency in political ads and safeguarding platform integrity by tackling fake accounts.
- Tier 2: Low-Barrier Designs. This is focused on supporting prosocial norms through design features like tags, buttons, and nudges. Examples include user verification tags, reaction buttons to be exposed to diverse views, and friction slowdowns to reduce over-usage and impulsive sharing.
- Tier 3: Designs for Social Cohesion. This is focused on developing technology specifically for civic engagement and deliberation. Examples include platforms using bridging algorithms to highlight common ground, tools for humanising interactions, and systems for meaningful public voting on policy options. Out-

² While the Blueprint addresses a range of digital technologies, this policy analysis narrows down its focus to “platform governance”, with a particular emphasis on “design governance.” The latter serves as a more neutral term to describe “prosocial tech design governance,” which shares its objectives but emphasizes broader tech governance and positive, prosocial outcomes.

of-the-box approaches to design governance are also considered.

Beyond this tiered framework, the Blueprint explores alternative approaches to incentivize prosocial tech design. These include anti-monopoly laws to prevent dominant tech companies from stifling innovation and competition, as well as data portability and interoperability mandates to enable users to transfer their data freely across services. Ideally, these measures aim to break monopolistic control over user data and empower smaller, prosocial platforms to thrive within digital ecosystems. Additionally, to ensure algorithmic transparency and social inclusion, the Blueprint supports the implementation of “[bridging algorithms](#)”, namely the design of algorithms that reward behaviors that bridges divides, helping to find common grounds among groups. These measures require platforms to disclose how their algorithms prioritize content, reducing polarization and fostering healthier digital conversations by promoting diverse viewpoints. Furthermore, the Blueprint suggests measures to shift market incentives toward prosocial tech design, such as establishing metrics for prosocial impact, exploring financial disincentives (e.g., [taxing platforms based on their “polarization footprint”](#)), and developing alternative models for public and private funding. Finally, the document proposes treating platforms as essential public utilities to prioritize public interest, equity, and transparency, potentially involving participatory governance or “[platform democracy](#)” for greater accountability. It also emphasizes the importance of public-private partnerships to define and measure prosocial technology design, fostering collaboration through research and experiments to create better digital public spaces. Collectively, these provisions aim to build a fair, inclusive, and socially responsible digital ecosystem.

3. Takeaways from the Workshop

The Workshop on Prosocial Tech Design Governance aimed to analyze the evolution of prosocial tech governance, particularly in light of regulations such as the DSA. The discussions focused on how to translate the Blueprint’s principles into actionable policies within the EU framework. During the workshop, several doubts and concerns were raised, leading to comprehensive clarifications and exchanges. Here, we outline the main takeaways from this discussion.

1) Nudging could gain momentum to become a mainstream and systemic policy approach.

Nudging generally refers to the subtle intervention in the decision-making environment to influence people’s behaviour without restricting their freedom of choice. It is one of the main underlying strategies to achieve the Blueprint’s objectives. And yet, nudging is considered by many as a form of undesirable paternalism that may set limitations on freedom (as if platforms haven’t nudged users for more than a decade in the opposite direction - what are also called sludges). It is true, however, that ‘nudges’ work more effectively when implemented stealthily and that their deployment is open to abuse. Indeed, even if the debate on nudging in digital environments may have become more mainstream, this policy strategy has never took off. From Twitter’s prompt before retweeting without reading to Meta’s fact-check labels and all the “take a break” or “set time limits” features, there have been various yet scattered and discreet attempts to leverage the power of design for social good (i.e., pro social design). Public opinion seems shifting towards a more proactive regulation. Instead of being a threat to autonomy, nudging can indeed enhance autonomy and, conversely, help to address the increasing concerns on social media usage (Grüning et al. 2024). There are, in fact, nudging frameworks that claim to fully respect users’ autonomy of choice, for example “pro-ethical design” (Floridi 2016) and self-nudging (Reijula and Hertwig 2022). Notably, it has been showed that there is a notable consensus for public policies that take advantage of nudging in the EU (Reisch and Sunstein 2016). While promising, this potential shift also presents critical challenges: How can nudging policies be

formalized within institutional frameworks? What strategies ensure their effective implementation? How can broad consensus be built for timely interventions in the rapidly evolving social media space? And how should the balance between personal nudges (self-nudging) and collective defaults be determined? In any case, it would be essential to implement such interventions transparently, explaining the intended goals and providing evidence of their effectiveness. The Prosocial Design Network, through its catalog of interventions available on its website, provides an excellent example of this potential. Although much research remains to be conducted and numerous questions need further exploration, nudging stands out as a powerful tool that could and should be leveraged for the social good. In this sense, the Prosocial Design Blueprint has the potential to play a pivotal role on this policy, informing and addressing the existing gaps in European design governance.

2) Prosocial tech design goes well beyond improving users' autonomy and addressing democratic challenges. A key insight from this workshop was that the scope of prosocial tech design extends far beyond issues like disinformation, affective polarization, or even the dominance of big tech monopolies. Instead, prosocial tech design has the potential to tackle more foundational societal challenges. One critical area of focus is the addictive design of social media platforms, which should be approached primarily as a public health issue. Although conclusive evidence remains limited, younger generations appear particularly vulnerable to the effects of social media consumption, with potential repercussions for mental health and social relationships. From self-reported information, one-third of European people aged 16-30 use social media for more than 2 hours a day, which is associated with a substantial increase in the prevalence of loneliness (Dhombres et al. 2024). Similarly, the U.S. are grappling with what has been officially described as an epidemic of loneliness and isolation (Office of the Surgeon General 2023), and [the technological trends could exacerbate several negative trends](#). While the causal relationship is yet to be fully understood - indeed, it matters more how social media is used than how often it is used - it is evident that the overuse of social media can exacerbate feelings of isolation,

just as social isolation can drive individuals toward increased social media use. By prioritizing prosocial tech design, policymakers can address not only the immediate impacts of addictive technologies but also their long-term societal implications, including the erosion of social cohesion and community well-being. Limiting social media usage may indeed improve psychological well-being on multiple dimensions (Faulhaber et al. 2023). So far, no law requires specific evidence that the current options offered to users, most notably setting time limits, are [truly designed to support users' willingness](#) and, thus, effective. On the contrary, most social media still have the infinite scroll by design. And yet, if Article 25 DSA was interpreted more broadly, this may be considered a dark pattern and, therefore, tools to control should be afforded to users. This would be in line with the recent [EU's parliament call for an assessment and a ban on harmful addictive techniques not covered by the directive on Unfair Commercial Practice](#), which also include the infinite scroll. In this context, prosocial tech design could provide evidence and guidance that can be used to interpret EU regulation more broadly, and effectively improve the overall long-term well-being of users and societies.

3) The European Union's approach to regulation is inspiring policymakers worldwide and could serve as a driver for meaningful change. Among scholars and policymakers worldwide, there is a shared optimism that the EU's emerging approach can establish a benchmark for a more ethical and evidence-based governance. A key component of this optimism lies in the EU's ability to mandate transparency and grant researchers access to critical data, thereby fostering more informed and empirically grounded policy interventions. In this context, the EU is uniquely positioned to harness its "Brussels effect"—when EU regulations set global standards due to its market's economic and political influence (Bradford 2020). By proactively integrating design governance principles into its regulatory framework, the EU can push global tech platforms toward adopting prosocial design as a default practice, encouraging more ethical and socially responsible digital environments. Moreover, by embedding principles of prosocial tech design into its regulations, the EU could catalyze international cooperation and standard-setting in platform gover-

nance. This approach may strengthen the EU's regulatory influence and reinforce its role as a leader in addressing the societal and ethical challenges posed by digital technologies. By seizing this opportunity, the EU can not only inspire other regions to adopt similar frameworks but also advance a responsible and ethical technological transition during turbulent times. And yet, despite the EU's role in setting ambitious regulatory standards, the regulatory spillover effects may be limited because many of the DSA's provisions are overall more costly to implement for all markets where platforms operate (Husovec and Urban 2024). Only time will tell whether platforms will engage in geo-localised enforcement to prevent giving the DSA an extraterritorial effect. The EU's regulatory framework may inspire globally, but that inspiration does not necessarily translate into concrete policy influence or change.

4) The European Union's regulation, particularly the DSA, remains fraught with uncertainty regarding its implementation and potential outcomes. While the DSA introduces important provisions, such as ensuring access to data for research, mandating risk assessments and mitigation strategies, ensuring independent audits, and enhancing user control over recommender systems, these aspects are still open to interpretation and possible pushback from platforms against full compliance. The ambiguity surrounding many of DSA's provisions reflects broader concerns about how they will be practically applied in the diverse and rapidly evolving digital landscape. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these measures will also heavily depend on the establishment of new institutional structures and processes that are still in the early stages of development. For instance, the bodies responsible for overseeing compliance, such as the Digital Services Coordinators (DSC), and the new regulatory mechanisms designed to monitor platform behaviours like the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT), are yet to fully unfold, and their roles are still being defined. Given the digital ecosystem's complex and dynamic nature, applying the DSA's provisions may also encounter unforeseen challenges. The requirement of accessing data for research, for example, may trigger tensions with VLOPs and, eventually, threaten the co-regulatory approach un-

derlying much of the DSA provisions (Chystoforova & Reviglio 2025). As such, the true impact of the DSA will be revealed only as these institutional bodies evolve and the regulatory process matures. At the same time, translating the abstract principles enshrined in the law into code and design remains an open-ended challenge (Floridi 2021). This requires a deeply interdisciplinary pursuit, and few organizations have both theoretical knowledge of values and the technical skills to do that, and this is a serious challenge for EU institutions as well. Again, prosocial tech design could be helpful in this sense. Without a more ambitious interpretation of the DSA, the development of new bodies with the needed human and financial resources, but also the implementation of additional delegated act and guidelines, however, the EU's governance seems unlikely to address the harms stemming from social media design (Reviglio et al. 2025).

5) The protection of minors and their mental health can be a key strategic entry point for promoting further pro-social tech design policies. Before exploiting the full potential of prosocial tech design in enhancing democracy and well-being, it seems more practical to centre the debate around issues that are widely recognized as urgent by the public. While in the last decade or so, public outrage over specific incidents usually led platforms to make only superficial adjustments to appease public concerns without substantial regulatory reforms (Annanny and Gillespie 2016), the growing awareness and intensity of public scrutiny have now created a more mature environment where such pressures can be channelled into legislation. Evidence suggests that sustained negative media attention has prompted platforms to revise their user policies (Marchal et al. 2024), and this trend now paves the way for transitioning from reactive adjustments to concrete policies. Several Western regulations are [addressing concerns about minors' usage of social media and implementing analogous laws to protect them](#). Notably, [Australia is even banning social media for children under 16](#). And yet, just a few years ago, [the Chinese policy of limiting the hours minors could play with and use the internet](#) was met with [scepticism in Western societies](#). In this context, Article 28 of the DSA supports stronger protections for minors online by empowering the European Commission to create and revise guidelines in response

to evolving challenges and evidence. By prioritizing the protection of vulnerable groups like minors and tackling the mental health implications of digital platforms, policymakers can ensure that the debate stays grounded in issues with direct and tangible impacts on society, and that, to different extents, are less politically contentious. Focusing on these pressing concerns could also serve as a strategy for garnering broader public support, which is essential for creating the momentum needed to push for other prosocial-driven regulatory changes.

4. Policy recommendations

To develop and implement grounded and effective design solutions, we advocate for the following general policy recommendations specifically aimed at European policymakers. Informed by the theory and the practice of prosocial tech governance, these recommendations aim to harness the potential of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the AI Act, and other European regulatory frameworks to foster a more responsible, ethical, and pro-social digital environment.

1) Policymakers cannot rely solely on their current knowledge to develop evidence-based policies, but they should be able to access VLOPs' exclusive knowledge. Over nearly two decades of operation, VLOPs have generated an extraordinary body of knowledge, not only on how users interact with content, but also on how to shape and influence those interactions. This accumulated knowledge—ranging from data on user preferences to the effects of algorithmic changes—represents a significant form of epistemic power that can potentially influence societal behaviour, political discourse, and even cultural norms. In principle, VLOPs should disclose some of the findings from their A/B testing, user testing, usability testing, and similar evaluations to assist researchers and policymakers in developing effective design solutions. In practice, these platforms have little incentive to share such information. It cannot be assumed that the necessary evidence for developing effective policies will be obtained solely through Article 40 of the DSA, which provides access to data for research. It might take years, and it will likely result in limited, partial evidence. The DSA, nonetheless, provides another solution that can be used as an *extrema ratio*: Article 69. In fact, the DSA empowers

the Commission to conduct inspections for the supervision, investigation, enforcement and monitoring of VLOPs. During inspections, VLOPs should, amongst others, “provide access to and explanations on its organisation, functioning, IT system, algorithms, data-handling and business practices and to record or document the explanations given” (Art.69(1)d). By strategically leveraging this power, regulators and policymakers alike could gain crucial access to the proprietary knowledge that platforms are unlikely to share willingly, thereby using platforms' knowledge to serve the public interest. In this way, the DSA offers a unique opportunity to shift the dynamics of platform governance and push for more informed and evidence-based policies.

2) Policymakers cannot rely solely on off-platform research to develop evidence-based policies, but they should enable researchers to conduct experiments within platforms. To collect sounding evidence, researchers can currently only conduct simulations and “off-platform experiments” that, however, often lack “ecological validity”: findings are not generalizable to how platforms really work (Thorburn et al. 2022). In legal proceedings as well as in scientific studies there are minimum standards to determine cause-and-effect relationships. Most of today's social media research, however, would unlikely meet the standards of causation as defined in science and in most jurisdictions (Leersen 2023). The most reliable methodological approach would be to run “on-platform experiments”, capable of better detecting causal relationships. Even then, experiments may not always be appropriate or reliable. Results may vary depending on platform, jurisdiction, time, and space. Yet, they could still improve algorithmic accountability and, importantly, even help policy-makers to test the effectiveness of specific design obligations. It is worth noting that, under the DSA, independent audits of algorithmic systems conducting on-platform experiments (e.g., A/B testing) are already mandated. According to Article 37 platforms must undergo, at their own expense and at least once a year, independent audits to assess compliance with the regulation. This will complement and interact with the assessment and mitigation of systemic risks, under the delegated regulation on the performance of audits (DRPA) (2024/436) (Artt. 13 and 14). The problem is that the same DSA auditors will need to be guided by previous research in any experi-

mental work they do, and to ensure this, external researchers should be given the same ability to conduct experimental work. This recommendation is not new (see, for example, GPAI 2023), yet it remains a *conditio sine qua non* for meaningfully advancing evidence-based platform and design governance. Instead of occasional audits and the reliance on non-generalizable, partial evidence, the ever-changing and complex nature of platforms demands continuous, real-time monitoring - what is known as “platform observability” (Rieder and Hofmann 2020) - and the ability to test causal hypotheses about the effects of platform technologies on users (Knott et al. 2024). Furthermore, a significant risk is that auditing will be captured by powerful auditors (Terzis et al. 2024). These challenges highlight the urgent need for a more robust and systemic framework to monitor social media and gather evidence.

3) The European Commission could further strengthen the EU digital regulation. While the DSA is most powerful in assessing and mitigating “systemic risks”, and its approach is thus substantially reactive and harm-based, prosocial design emphasizes proactive policy solutions that foster broad, positive outcomes. We can indeed begin to think of “systemic opportunities”; promoting not only social cohesion but also international cooperation (e.g., to promote peace and strengthen a global public sphere), political participation (e.g., nudging to go to vote), conscious social media usage (e.g., to effectively counteract overuse). At the same time, large platforms could also become an instrument to raise awareness on critical public-interest issues such as climate change and technological disruption. In this context, for example, Article 27 DSA, which allegedly provides users more control over the recommender systems, could end up mandating features to amplify specific content (e.g., public-interest content?). Similarly, Article 25 DSA on design interface can help to ban dark patterns and provide users more functionalities to exert their autonomy. Eventually, the Commission could issue additional guidelines (Art. 35), codes of conduct (Art. 45), or even delegated acts (Art. 87), and promote the development and implementation of voluntary standards to unlock potential “systemic opportunities”. Furthermore, it could also leverage other relevant regulations. For example, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) grants

users a right to “receive a plurality of news and current affairs content” (Art. 3) and a “structured dialogue” with VLOPs to “foster access to diverse offerings of independent media” is established accordingly (Art. 19). This provides a basis for integrating diversity-oriented prosocial design into recommender systems (Reviglio and Fabbri 2024). To enhance EU regulation in this context, the AI Act, which also governs recommender systems, can be leveraged too. The AI Act’s framework defines four levels of risk in AI: unacceptable, high, limited and minimal or no risk, carrying with them different obligations. Currently, recommender systems are classified only as “minimal risk” AI systems, which are systems free to use for which the only suggested regulatory action is the promotion of voluntary codes of conduct. Had the recommender systems remained under the high-risk category, [as originally suggested by the European Parliament](#), a series of additional obligations for platforms would have increased these systems’ safety, transparency and accountability. The European Commission has the authority to amend the list of AI systems classified under each risk category (Art. 73 of the AI Act). Including recommender systems in the high-risk category would enhance their oversight and governance.

4) Civil society and users should be further involved in platform and design governance processes. At present, civil society and researchers can propose design solutions as mitigation measures, but only VLOPs can test how they work in practice. According to the DSA, VLOPs should also engage with “representatives of groups potentially impacted by their services, independent experts, and civil society organisations” (Recital 90) and modify their design interfaces and recommender systems in order to mitigate systemic risks (Art. 35(d)), which include, among others, risks related to civic discourse, media freedom and pluralism, and even mental well-being (i.e., users’ addiction). One strategy to do this is incentivizing user explicit feedback by design. Despite being neglected in the DSA, user feedback has, among others, the potential to align algorithmic recommendations with users’ explicitly expressed preferences. More generally, this is an emerging method to control the output of AI systems in general, and social media’s recommender systems in particular (Stray 2023). Unfortunately, [there is evidence that some](#)

[VLOPs ignore users' feedback](#). Another promising strategy in this context is participatory governance, for example, the establishment of “social media councils”, which are independent, multi-stakeholder bodies designed to oversee, advise, and sometimes enforce accountability in how social media platforms manage content moderation (Kettemann and Schulz 2023). These can help to provide more legitimacy to the rules, design and algorithmic practices of platforms, and achieve “platform democracy” (Ovadya 2021), where platform-related decisions become informed and/or even made by the impacted populations. While the European Commission is experimenting with some of these assemblies (see, for instance, the [Conference on the Future of Europe](#)) (Gaiba 2022, Nicolaïdis 2024), meaningful engagement with civil society in social media governance remains limited, often relying on public consultations that favour industry stakeholders and organized advocacy groups while sidelining grassroots and diverse perspectives. Platforms like [Pol.is](#) or [Remash.ai](#), which facilitate large-scale discussions and integrate diverse viewpoints, demonstrate the potential for more inclusive engagement. However, such tools remain underutilized in EU policymaking. Expanding deliberative mini-publics could address these gaps, enabling more representative citizen input into social media governance.

5) Recognizing platforms as critical Infrastructures and redesigning them as public utilities. It is crucial to recognize that platforms – in particular VLOPs – are not just commercial entities or news gatekeepers but also public utilities and critical infrastructure that play a central role in global communication and societal functioning. On the one hand, recognizing them as ‘public utilities’ means shifting from profit-driven models to a public service approach, prioritizing equitable access, transparency, and social responsibility (Balkin 2021). On the other hand, platforms can be considered critical infrastructures because they support essential societal functions such as communication, social interaction, and the flow of information, much like energy, transportation, and healthcare systems (Li et al. 2018). As such, they should be subject to stricter oversight and regulations due to their importance in eventually maintaining national security, public health, and even economic stability. Moreover, the

significance of platforms in public opinion discourse has become increasingly evident through recent events such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the information warfare during the Ukraine and Palestine conflicts, Elon Musk’s abuse of its platform X, the Romanian elections annulment, and the TikTok ban. All these paradigmatic examples underline the urgent necessity of protecting platforms. More broadly, developing publicly accessible and accountable real-time monitoring systems capable of detecting and preventing the manipulation of public opinion through social media represents one of the most critical governance challenges of our time. In the face of increasing fragmentation and polarization in online spaces, it is also vital to rebuild trust and not to retreat into smaller, niche platforms that could exacerbate these issues. The scaling of platforms, while challenging, is essential for ensuring a more integrated and cohesive global digital space. Promoting policies that encourage platforms to function as responsible public utilities while recognizing them as critical infrastructure is no longer a choice but a necessary and evident step for effective governance. In doing so, the potential of prosocial design can be fully realized.

5. Conclusions

The Blueprint for Prosocial Tech Design Governance offers a comprehensive roadmap for creating a digital public square that prioritizes social good. By adopting design-focused regulations and exploring innovative governance approaches, the Blueprint aims to steer technological innovation towards building a more cohesive and equitable society. EU regulation has been a fundamental source of inspiration for this Blueprint, especially the Digital Services Act. The opposite is equally true. Informed by the outlined framework for prosocial tech design and its related proposed and tested design features, the EU regulation can advance minimum design standards and favour design for social cohesion through inclusive participation and deliberation. We believe further dialogue can lead to mutual inspiration and influence between the experience of the Prosocial Tech Design Governance and the implementation of the European digital regulation.

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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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
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